

depth throughout the period. This is particularly true in the imperial context. For example, Peden's assumption that the Dominion economies were moving toward the United States before 1939 is simply invalid. Their well-publicized posturing as independent states during the Munich crisis disguised complete dependence on the United Kingdom economy as an export market, which was in itself the result of Britain's status as the pre-eminent global trading power. Peden seems unaware that to primary producers such as Australia, the United States was a feared and bitter trading rival whose domestic market, however large, was effectively closed to their produce. Dominions resisted any weakening of imperial preference and their move into the U.S. orbit during the war was ultimately a side effect of Britain's prior move.

In conclusion, this book is valuable as a scholarly and erudite survey of Britain's decline to the second rank of powers. There are a number of problems with Peden's thesis, however, particularly in the sense that Britain's world role is not fully represented except, in the classic Treasury style, as a liability. The book ultimately performs a service in that the reader is struck by the large volume of research that remains to be done in this field, in a wider range of archives, before final conclusions can be drawn.

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ERIC G. E. ZUELOW. *Making Ireland Irish: Tourism and National Identity since the Irish Civil War*. (Irish Studies.) Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press. 2009. Pp. xxxiv, 344. \$39.95.

The turbulent political history of Ireland in the twentieth century has traditionally attracted most of the attention of those studying its past. As a consequence other aspects of the history of the new Irish state have long been neglected. In recent decades, however, a new interest in social, cultural, and economic change has produced some stimulating studies. Eric G. E. Zuelow's book on the development of tourism policy between 1923 and 2007 is the first complete overview of this topic to appear and is one of the better examples of the new work. On the basis of a detailed study of government and other primary sources, it does not just trace the interaction among politicians, interest groups, and local activists that shaped tourism policy, but, by analyzing three central aspects of the debate, it tries to illuminate how Irish national identity was formed.

This connection between tourism policy and identity formation is indeed a challenging notion. Tourism policy is potentially an interesting angle to take as it poses questions about how a country presents itself to outsiders and therefore what people think it should constitute. However, to identify what it was that made Ireland Irish from debates on tourism policy is not an easy task. It requires, as Zuelow states, an in-depth analysis of the links among all parties involved and the ability

to isolate elements and motivations that were associated with Irishness from those that were not.

Zuelow has a good grasp of the literature on the role of tourism and is well aware of the academic debates on nationalism and identity. He also makes the importance of tourism to Ireland abundantly clear. Apart from its impact on the landscape—for instance, through instigating the “tradition” of painting Irish houses in different colors—tourism's importance can particularly be seen in the economic arena. This also constitutes the most serious problem for the attempt to draw conclusions on national identity. On the few occasions where tourist developments were resisted by various groups, the economic interest always won out. Although language enthusiasts, who were very well represented in the new nationalist elite, were worried about the effects of the influx of mostly English-speaking tourists into Irish-speaking areas, nothing was done to control tourism in these areas—notwithstanding a plan by the minister of finance to isolate tourists and hire local people to speak Irish to them. The fact that economic concerns always won out does, of course, not mean that the Irish language was not important to Irish identity.

An associated problem is that tourism policy was mostly an elite concern. National identity is, as Zuelow argues, created by ordinary people, but this book does not tell the story of ordinary people. Apart from the involvement of some government departments, most of the developments described were engineered by a few interest groups. The most influential was the Irish Tourist Association, a body dominated by hoteliers and other involved parties, whose central role was institutionalized by the government until the 1970s. The fact that its actions brought in regional development and improvement of local amenities, such as rubbish collection, gave the organization popular support in tourist spots, but many areas were entirely untouched and therefore barely involved in the debate on tourist policy.

Decisions with regard to tourism as a result often had less to do with what made Ireland Irish for the Irish than with what visitors imagined made it Irish. The tourist festival An Tóstal, the main government initiative, was based on the Festival of Britain; the large “See Ireland First” campaign was copied from America; and, during the second half of the twentieth century, all tourist brochures were designed by a Dutchman. As a result Zuelow is a bit at a loss to find debates that touch upon Irish identity. In his more analytical chapters he discusses at length the restoration of Kilmainham Jail, which was done in the 1960s by voluntary labor and had no association with tourist policy, and the development of the Guinness brewery as a tourist attraction, which was a purely commercial initiative.

One can only conclude that the scarcity of debate about the content of Irishness and the prominence of economic concerns makes it difficult to draw conclusions about national identity from tourism policy. The book is therefore somewhat descriptive and does not really touch on the debate on Irishness that was en-

gaged in elsewhere. There is nevertheless much to recommend Zuelow's study. It is well researched and written, and provides an excellent insight into how Irish tourism policy was developed and who engineered it. It also shows how Irish politics worked in practice and what elements were emphasized in public debate. The central intention to bring the development of Irish national identity to the fore was, however, probably an overambitious task.

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EUNAN O'HALPIN. *Spying on Ireland: British Intelligence and Irish Neutrality during the Second World War*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2008. Pp. xxi, 335. \$60.00.

The "Emergency," as World War II came to be known in Ireland, has attracted much interest, a trend visible in recent studies by Brian Girvin and Clair Wills and even a successful stage musical, *Improbable Frequency*, which capitalizes on the comic potential of a wartime Dublin populated by Nazi spies, British agents, and Irish Republican Army (IRA) fifth columnists. Most research has focused on the maintenance of (southern) Irish neutrality within the context of the Anglo-Irish relationship and related issues such as censorship, intelligence, and espionage. Consequently, Eunan O'Halpin's study of British intelligence in Ireland addresses issues that are the subject of a considerable historiography, including British policy on partition, Axis espionage, Anglo-Irish security cooperation, and the propaganda war over neutrality.

However, O'Halpin's sharp focus—his is the first monograph systematically to analyze the role of all British security agencies active in wartime Ireland—and access to declassified sources succeeds in shedding new light on the Emergency. His decision to assess British policy on Ireland within the context of Britain's treatment of other neutral states within its sphere of influence, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, rather than the usual European suspects, coupled with the surprising degree of importance attached to espionage and diplomacy in wartime Ireland by the allies, has resulted in an impressive case study of intelligence and neutrality that transcends its geographical focus.

British intelligence in Ireland was a game of two halves. O'Halpin outlines the remarkable lack of pre-war political and security interest in Ireland despite the obvious strategic problems that a neutral Ireland would pose. This was exemplified by the return of the "treaty ports" to Irish control in 1938 without due consideration of the security implications, Britain's lack of intelligence-gathering capabilities in Ireland, and the absence of structures to facilitate bilateral security and political cooperation. Much of this can be attributed to the ambiguous, shifting nature of the interwar Anglo-Irish relationship.

Consequently, when intelligence on Ireland first became an urgent necessity following Germany's occupa-

tion of France in the summer of 1940, British capabilities proved inadequate to the task. The quality of intelligence was poor, there was insufficient cooperation between the intelligence agencies active within Ireland, and little coordination or oversight of their efforts. O'Halpin asserts that the most significant outcome of this "spectacular intelligence failure" (p. 95) was Britain's remarkable offer to support unification in return for Irish support in the war, which he sees as a consequence of a flawed understanding of the relative strengths of Eamon de Valera's government and the pro-German IRA. The threat of invasion receded with Adolf Hitler's invasion of Russia, but Ireland remained a source of concern due to the fear that the presence of Axis legations, working with an IRA fifth column or the German spies periodically parachuted into the country, would compromise the security of the preparations for the invasion of Europe. As a result, the first diplomatic traffic targeted by the Government Code and Cipher School (GC&CS) following the cracking of Germany's diplomatic cipher in 1942 was Berlin-Dublin. It was not until after Operation Overlord that Ireland resumed its former status as a marginal backwater. By then, British intelligence had surmounted its inadequacies in impressive fashion, fashioning an effective security and intelligence capability underpinned both by a strong working relationship between Irish and British security and government officials and effective cooperation between Britain's security agencies.

O'Halpin generally confirms rather than challenges the received wisdom, but he does so in authoritative detail, providing what will surely remain the definitive study of British intelligence in wartime Ireland (despite his lack of access to many Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) records). De Valera's successful defence of neutrality in the face of Axis and Allied intrigue stemmed from a combination of determination, skill, and pragmatic acquiescence to British security interests. Winston Churchill's reputation as a great war leader does not rest on his mastery of the complexities of intelligence and security cooperation. Britain's man in Dublin, John Maffey, played an important role in the successful Anglo-Irish relationship, while the belligerent U.S. representative, David Gray, repeatedly jeopardized its fruits, particularly with his potentially disastrous demand for the expulsion of Axis diplomats prior to Overlord. Irish security forces, north and south, performed effectively, notably Irish military intelligence, G2, which penetrated German and British intelligence-gathering operations without detection.

This case study touches on issues of broader concern. To what extent does intelligence inform political policy and military actions? O'Halpin is candid about the difficulty of demonstrating a direct link, but his study convincingly details the importance attached to intelligence by wartime politicians. Consequently, it raises some salutary points with contemporary resonances. British intelligence failed in 1939–1940 because it had not anticipated the threat posed by Germany due to its preoccupation (for ideological and strategic reasons)